However, Russian Forces Still Pose A Threat Krynky is located on Russia-controlled left bank of Dnipro River in southern Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast and was established by Ukrainian troops occupying it earlier. However, Russia may still attempt to crush this position before it takes root and expands.
On June 6, someone–possibly Russian saboteurs–blew up Kakhovka Dam upstream of Krynky and quickly caused it to flood, forcing many residents of Krynky into higher ground or elsewhere.
Krynky’s troubles had only just begun. On Oct. 19, Ukrainian troops from the 38th Marine Brigade crossed over from Ukraine into Krynky via crossing of the Dnipro River and infiltrated it.
Since liberating north Kherson Oblast on the river’s right bank in late 2022, Ukrainian forces have conducted several small-scale raids along the Dnipro. Most often, Ukrainian forces attack Russian positions and kill or incapacitate some before inflicting injuries before withdrawing when Russian drones or artillery arrive to attack.
However, the October 19 attack was different in nature; Ukrainian troops invaded Krynky and have expanded their influence along the three mile-wide settlement. Ten days after they first arrived they still remain there today but their power is growing along its entire three mile length.
One Russian marine from the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade found conditions at his brigade to be very challenging.
Reports state that Ukrainian forces have been firing artillery, using cluster munitions, and employing drones and UAVs with grenades which operate continuously to block our evacuation of wounded service members and delivery of ammunition supplies.
Krynky could serve as an ideal location to allow Ukrainian forces equipped with heavy equipment to cross the Dnipro in large numbers and create another front for their four-month-old southern offensive.
Could be. Bridgeheads are vulnerable to artillery fire, air strikes and mechanized counterattacks until significant heavy forces cross over, expand their boundaries and add defensive firepower. Troops from the 38th Marine Division have already crossed the water; however there’s no evidence yet of armored vehicles, air defense systems, or engineering equipment being transported with them.
“Attempting significant advances without armored vehicle support is unlikely to succeed in an environment in which the enemy can deploy armored vehicles easily,” according to the nonpartisan Conflict Intelligence Team.
Factually speaking, Russia remains capable of attacking any bridgehead and dismantling it before it grows further.
Ukrainian troops would ideally cross the Dnipro in large numbers at or near Krinky. A move south would eliminate many Russian regiments near its mouth and place Ukrainians on the frontline of Russian-occupied Crimea.
River crossings can be perilous. Just ask the Russian army, which attempted using pontoons to cross Ukraine’s Donets River using pontoons in May 2022 but was caught between its banks with Ukrainian drones and artillery fire, leading to a barrage that destroyed more than 80 armored vehicles and injured 500 Russians in total.
If Ukrainian forces can construct pontoon bridges and transport tanks, combat vehicles, and heavy equipment across Dnipro River to Krinky bridgehead without interference from Russian army units near this settlement area, it could be that major reinforcements might not arrive soon enough to provide support.
Russian forces in Ukraine are at their limit. Not only are brigades or regiments fighting defensive battles against Ukraine’s counteroffensive on various fronts in eastern and southern Ukraine, they are also conducting offensive operations – including around Avdiivka and Kreminna Forest – in eastern regions of Ukraine.
Avdiivka offensive has proven costly for Russian forces. Ukrainian 110th Mechanized Brigade and other units have killed hundreds of Russians while also dismantling an entire brigade within three weeks.
Russian losses at Avdiivka go beyond men and equipment: they also cost them opportunities; this reduces their ability to dedicate forces toward another operation – such as attacking Krynky bridgehead.
Kremlin’s hopes for an advantageous outcome at Krynky stem from the fact that Ukrainian forces are under immense strain as they attempt to maintain an offensive and hold Avdiivka.
Two years since Russia and Ukraine’s war began, both sides are almost equally powerful according to CIT. “Neither side possesses sufficient resources to pursue and exploit an ambitious breakthrough strategy.”
Kyiv has made clear its unwillingness to exchange Krynky or any other offensive initiative for Avdiivka in Russian-occupied Donetsk’s northwestern corner, where Russian logistics thrive.
While Russian forces continue to pour battalions into Avdiivka and Avdiivka, Ukrainian reinforcements have only sent limited reinforcements in support of 110th brigade and other brigades of garrison in Avdiivka and Avdiivka.
“Ukrainian officials have identified the Avdiivka push as part of Russia’s covert fixing operation and they are unlikely to commit too many resources toward it,” noted the Institute for the Study of War in Washington D.C. just hours after Russia launched their attack.
Should the 38th Marine Brigade manage to retain and expand their hold on Krynky Bridgehead, Avdiivka may provide the catalyst. Kyiv’s willingness and determination to risk its destruction may also play a part.
